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IN CELEBRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL

KINDNESS: SOFT SYMBOLISM IN A HARD SHELL
JAMES AUDLEY MCLAUGHIiN*

The bicentennial of any constitution is surely an invitation to
much sententious rhetoric. But the bicentennial of THE Constitution, The American Constitution of 1787, is an occasion for oratorical pyrotechnics of the first magnitude. So I shall make my brief
tribute to note the importance of the Constitution as symbol symbol of our national resolve to be a good society.
Constitutions, in general, have two distinct functions: (1) As the
outward sign and symbol of a society's fundamental commitment
to social values and (2) perhaps more mundanely, as the framework
for a political order. Our Constitution of 1787 (or '88 when ratified)
has served well in both capacities: it gives prominent notice and
articulate voice to our fundamental commitment to our vision of
the values of the good society and it has served quite admirably as
the framework for our political order.
As a framework for our political order it is, in Professor William
W. Van Alstyne's phrase, "hard law."' The Constitution as sign
and symbol is not "hard law" and, indeed, may appear not to be
"law" at all. However, because of the general perception of our
Constitution as "hard law," our Constitution's role as sign and
symbol is dramatically enhanced. Enhanced, in fact, to the point
of being law -

albeit "soft law" -

and, it is the thesis of this

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., 1962, Ohio State University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State University.
This article began as a speech I delivered at W.V.U.'s Law Day dinner in April 1987. It has
been substantially expanded since then though its main theme has not changed. I want to thank
Patrica Morrison for her benign edititng of this essay. Through our numerous discussions, she suggested many ways that I might clarify my ideas (or at least not unnecessarily confuse their presentation). Discussions with faculty colleagues have, as ever, been instrumental in forming my ideas but
special thanks is due John Bonsignore and Thomas Barton.
I From a paper prepared for the Plenary Session program, "The Idea of the Constitution,"
held at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in Los Angeles on January
5, 1987 and reproduced as Van Alstyne, The Idea of the Constitution as Hard Law, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 174 (1987).
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celebratory salute that the Constitution's soft law role is, ironically,
more important than its role as hard law.
I shall develop my thesis by first briefly describing (after Van
Alstyne) the hard law aspect of our Constitution, then by describing
the soft law aspect - what it means to say that the Constitution
is sign and symbol, and of what; how this symbolism is made significant (and not merely an historical or sociological observation)
by the hard law nature of our Constitution; and finally, in a grand
effort at an original pyrotechnic, I will suggest that the value that
our soft law Constitution most importantly symbolizes today is kindness - then you skeptics can look upward and see what a pretty
glow it makes!
THE HARD LAW CONSTITUTION

It is as framework for a political order that the Constitution is
mostly noted: The three branches of government; its checks and
balances of both the horizontal separation of powers and the vertical
separation of federalism; its limitations on governmental action, limitations that leave certain areas of both our private lives and public
activities exempt from intrusion - no matter how majoritarian, wellintended or benign the intrusion might seem; and finally its guarantees of orderly and fair process in creating and administering law.
It is as this framework for our political order that ourConstitution is "HardLaw." Professor Van Alstyne counts its quality of being hard law as our Constitution's principal virtue. 2 The
phrase "hard law" connotes two different ideas. Hard law means
both permanent, reliable - hard like a diamond - difficult to
change, impervious to political caprice; and also hard in the sense
of substantial, real, determinant not abstract. It is hard in this second sense because of judicial review.3 Judicial review gives remedies
that are enforceable - and respected even by Congress. When the
Court tells Congress that the Constitution means Congress must seat

2

Id. at 179-82.

Id. at 180. Of course, Chief Justice Marshall's argument on judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is premised squarely on the notion that the Constitution is
law - law that judges apply. In America, the only "true"
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/8
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someone it has refused to seat, Congress seats that person. 4 When
the Constitution (through the Court) tells the President he may not
seize the steel mills, the mills remain unseized. 5 Judicial review causes
us to think of constitutional law as real hard law, not a set of
political ideals for theoreticians in political science but for lawyers
taught in law schools and practicing in the real world.
Van Alstyne counts the first kind of hardness - its crystalline
hardness or resistance to change - as more important.6 But we all
know it does change. The Warren Court era is celebrated (and lamented) for such change. The Burger Court is lamented (and celebrated) for slowing down the Warren progress. And the Rehnquist
Court is feared (or cheered) because it may reverse the change.
In my view, the Constitution's being hard law in the sense of
real law

-

not mere political ideals -

is more important. Because

of judicial review everyone feels bound by our Constitution, from
Presidents and the administrative bureaucracy through state legislatures, down to city councils, school boards, and the cop on the
beat; the Constitution is binding law and not just some high-sounding political ideal easily rationalized away under the press of daily
exigency. Whether judicial remedy might be available or not, might
be sought or not in a particular circumstance, the idea that constitutional limitations are legal limitations has a powerful restraining
influence. The exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment, 7 for instance, restricts police behavior in part because the police are punished by being denied the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
to gain a conviction, 8 but more importantly the exclusionary rule

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6 I infer this from the emphasis in Van Alstyne's article (and speech), but he does mention
judicial review as important to our Constitution's hardness. Indeed, he states, "One may virtually
declare that, to be hard law, a constitution must, in fact, be exceptionally difficult to alter, as well
as readily enforceable in accessible andprofessionallyserious courts." (emphasis added). Van Alstyne,
4

supra note 1, at 181.
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Of course, technically it is the fourth amendment as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment that creates the rights against state and local
law enforcement officers. The exclusionary rule was applied to federal officers directly through the
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restrains police conduct because it powerfully reinforces the notion

that the fourth amendment is hard law. The pull from the duty to
obey the law is, I am suggesting, more powerful than the push from

the fear of punishment. So the exclusionary rule gives both a push
and a pull. Moreover, the exclusionary rule reinforces the notion,
by example, that all constitutionalrights and the correlative official
duties are legally binding rights and duties. 9

fourth amendment as early as 1914 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a recent
discussion of the purpose of the exclusionary rule see Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987) (Blackmun, J., for the Court & O'Connor with Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 The relationship between the coercive aspect of law and the sense of obligation created by
law is much mooted by legal philosophers. For example, Philip Soper, a Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan, contends that the sense of obligation that is essential to lawness comes from
the lawgivers purporting to be just:
Legal systems [as opposed to what he calls coercive systems and moral systems] are essentially characterized by the belief in value, the claim in good faith by those who rule
that they do so in the interest of all. It is this claim of justice, rather than justice in fact,
that one links conceptually with the idea of law. Thus, the differences between law, morality,
and coercion may be represented in terms of the variables of force and the belief in value.
Law combines the organized sanction with the claim to justice by those who wield the
sanction. Morality makes the same claim but lacks the sanction. Coercive systems rely on
the sanction alone, unaccompanied by any concern for justice.
P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 55 (1984) (footnote omitted).
Constitutional symbolism creates an essentially "moral system" that stands prior to and above
the legal system including the system of judicially enforceable constitutional norms. But since this
supermoral system of constitutional values is embedded in, intimately associated with and indeed
immanent in hard constitutional law, it takes on a more powerful caste, a more influential aura.
Why is this? Because when the mind converts "moral obligation" to "legal obligation," it becomes
more obligating, that is, more likely to be honored. And this is so because there is in our society a
profound respect for law. That is, there obtains in our society a fundamental moral imperative to
obey the law. Thus it is not the fear of punishment for disobedience that causes legal obligation to
be more "obligating" than moral obligation but rather the profound sense of moral obligation to
obey the law.
On the other hand, Soper implies (but does not draw out) that it is not just the claim of justice
that converts coercion to law, it is the "claim of coercion" that converts morality to law. Thus what
causes moral obligation to become legal obligation is coercion or the equivalent of coercion, he,
breach of the obligation makes a concrete difference in an official forum such as a court of law.
That is what the "exclusionary rule" does for the fourth amendment. Disobedience makes a difference.
The wrongfully obtained evidence cannot be used though it is otherwise perfectly probative of the
guilt of some social-malfactor. Because it cannot be used, the "wrongfully obtained" is converted
into the "illegally obtained" evidence, the constitutional duty goes from being a mere moral duty to
a legal duty, and compliance is much more likely.
Whether you are persuaded by this argument will depend primarily on whether or not you believe
my factual assertion that legal obligation is a (perhaps "the") primary moral obligation in our society.
Like any merely factual assertion it cannot be conclusively proved, but being a factual assertion of
vast generality even the idea of marshalling evidence is problematic: what counts as evidence of this
phenomenon; how much does it take? I am persuaded that my proposition is true by the following
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CONSTITUTIONAL KINDNESS

THE CONSTITUTION AS SIGN AND SYMBOL

As wonderful as our hard law Constitution is, it is its soft law
aspect I wish to particularly celebrate: the Constitution as the repository of fundamental values - as the outward sign of our social
resolve to be a good society - and as articulate symbo ° of our

kinds of things I have observed (by just living in this society): the constant reference to, and veneration
of, "the law-abiding citizen" in the press, in literature, in schools, in meetings; by and large we pay
our taxes; by and large we obey regulatory law except traffic law that seem unreasonable; national
mythology about being a government of law, not men, etc.; and the desire for an equal rights amendment long after it was needed....
,0The Constitution as symbol is not a new theme. In Cornell historian Michael Kammen's
recent book, M. KAimuAN, A MAcHnwE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AmImRICAN
CULTURE (1986), he points out that:

Edward S. Corwin published an essay in 1936 entitled 'The Constitution as Instrument and
as Symbol' [30 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1071 (1936)] that swiftly became a scholarly classic.
Significant for having alerted students of government and history to the dual role the Constitution has played in American political culture, it remains fascinating because it is so
resonant to major public issues of the mid-1930's. Corkin attacked the 'rise of constitutional
negativism' in general, and a conservative organization called the Liberty League in particular for its tendency to perceive the Constitution only in terms of constraints, and for
the League's 'fetishism' and unwillingness to accept the inevitability of change.
Corwin's treatment of the genesis and development of the constitution as a national
symbol was necessarily sketchy. No one subsequently has enlarged upon his cursory schematization, however. It is both logical and essential to do so here. It may be correct to
contend, as Corwin did, that the U.S. Constitution emerged as a national symbol between
1789 and 1860; but that assertion only becomes meaningful and valid if we add that the
process occurred both haltingly and incompletely in antebellum America.
Id. at 68.
Kammen goes on to enlarge upon that theme. He concludes the chapter with:
By contrast [with Latin American Constitutions], the U.S. Constitution had been a
genuine outgrowth of indigenous political experience during the long phase of colonial apprenticeship and the swifter transformation of Revolutionary adolescence. The framers were
fully aware of European constitutional ideas, but had drawn upon them selectively and
modified them wherever it seemed appropriate. Fenimore Cooper combined chauvinism with
realistic self-recognition when he wrote from Dresden in 1830 that 'we are unique as a
government, and we must look for our maxims in the natural corollaries of the Constitution.'
Twenty years later Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote less thoughtfully but with typical
panache that the U.S. Constitution 'is all that gives us a NATIONAL character.' That was
an outrageous overstatement-a half-truth at best. What matters, however, is that by 1850
a great many Americans shared his assumption. The instrument was finally becoming a
symbol, one that the society regarded as culturally determinative.
Id. at 94.
As can be noted from the excerpt, Kammen (and Corwin) were referring to the Constitution as
a symbol of nationhood much like the flag, national anthem or pledge of allegiance. Although Kammen's Constitution as symbol of nationhood is a somewhat more articulate symbolism than the flag
etc. as symbol, it is a less articulate symbolism than I am here arguing obtains. Even the Constitution
as symbol of permanent, shared values (regardless of content) referred to at the very end of this
article is somewhat more expressive than the notion of a unique national character.
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vision of the values that make a good society. Freedom, equality,
fairness and kindness" are not only official policy but have become
1 Obviously, other formulations of America's fundamental values could be made. For instance
"justice" and "law" are fundamental ideals. Indeed, they are so fundamental, so general, and so
vague as to constitute overarching ideals. Justice includes equality, fairness and social welfare or
kindness, while law is the form through which our moral values are largely realized. As suggested
above, legal obligation is itself probably the most powerful moral obligation in our culture (See supra
note 9). That constitutional duties are legal duties is quite important to their observance. That certain
values of public or political morality can be ranked as constitutional values is made much more
significant by the fact of the association of our constitution with law, hard law as suggested above.
But privacy, why not privacy as a fundamental value? The right of privacy is often mentioned
in constitutional discourse. Kindness never is. The right of privacy encompasses the two distinct values:
(1) of personal secrecy/anonymity and (2) autonomy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) fits the latter
notion. Autonomy is another word for liberty. It means "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (Stevens, J.).
The autonomy (or liberty) associated with the privacy decisions is limited to the right to marry
(Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)); to procreate (Skinner v, Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942));
to make procreative decisions (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), especially as interpreted
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 432 U.S. 678 (1977));
to make childbearing decisions (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); and to make certain childrearing
decisions (See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to send children to parochial
school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to have children learn German in school)
especially as resurrected and reinterpreted in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, (see Justice Black's dissent at
507); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to withdraw child from school after eighth grade
in violation of truancy law if decision to withdraw is based on "deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group and intimately related to daily living." Id. at 216)).
This notion of autonomy in matters of private morality as traditionally conceived has been
rejected by the Court in all matters outside the traditional family area. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986) reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1985 (1987) (no fundamental right to engage in private
homosexual consensual sodomy). The five to four vote in that case (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens dissented) shows the matter to be close and that there is movement (i.e., Justice Blackmun)
in the direction of a right of general sexual autonomy. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S.
901 (1976) summarily aff'g, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court). Such a movement
toward sexual (or lifestyle) autonomy is certainly maturing but even when it does come to fruition
in constitutional law it is simply another aspect of freedom.
As to the other meaning of privacy-secrecy/anonymity or "avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, (1977) (Stevens, J.) - it has not had significant constitutional development although it has had some constitutional recognition. See Griswold, 381 U.S.
479, opinion by Justice Douglas, but see his concurrence in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 167. In Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Court referred for the first time to "freedom of
intimate association" (as contrasted with "freedom of expressive association," Id. at 610.). See also
Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987) (refusing to find such a "right of intimate
association" in an association of thousands of local Rotary Clubs). Thus privacy as anonymity could
also be seen as a freedom.
However, the value of intimate associations seems to me to be quite distinct from the right to
choose one's intimates which is clearly a freedom. The value of intimate associations when more fully
recognized in cultural practice will ultimately be the basis for the protection of homosexual practice.
See Karst, Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89 YALE L. J. 624 (1980).
Moreover, in Roberts and Rotary Club the intimacy value (however weakly manifested in service
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living ideals - ideals so deeply imbedded that they are "our Constitution" in the sense of how we are constituted as a political community.

The Constitution announces fundamental values only indirectly,
but the language of rights in which the values are immanent is often

sharp, precise and hard. "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech" 1 2 "no state shall deny to any person - within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"; 13 "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury";

14

and "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-

quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments imposed."'

5

That these values are not fully realized as one's personal ideals would require

-

or realized as fully

does not mean they are

not enshrined. As Hanna Pitkin suggests, a constitution is not only
something we have, but something we are (our nature as a political

community) and something we do (we are constituting ourselves).

6

clubs) was pitted against the moral cruelty of sexist practicewhich the states (Minnesota and California)
had intervened against (See J. SmaAR, infra note 26 and accompanying text). See Burns, The Exclusion
of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 321 (1983). Of course more than the psychic pain of moral cruelty is
involved in such sexist practice: equality of opportunity is systematically denied.
2 U.S. CO ST. amend. I.
"

Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. amend. VI.
Id. amend. VIII.

16 Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, (1987).
In part she says:
With respect to a community, this use of 'constitution' [in the sense of composition
or fundamental make-up] suggests a characteristic way of life, the national character of a
people, their ethos or fundamental nature as a people, a product of their particular history
and social conditions. In this sense, our constitution is less something we have than something we are....
The second use of 'constitution' which deserves our attention is its function as a verbal
noun pointing to action or activity of constituting - that is, of founding, framing, shaping
something new. In this sense, our constitution is neither something we have nor something
we are so much as something we do - or in any rate can do....
Unless we succeed in creating - together with others - something lasting, in...
clusive, principled and fundamental, we have not succeeded in constituting anything ....
[A]lthough constituting is always a free action, how we are able to constitute ourselves is
profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by our own distinctive history. Thus
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So we are a community where freedom, equality, fairness and kindness is our communal makeup - our communal constitution - and
the particular realization of those values, their interrelationships, the
actualized meaning of each is shifting and, hopefully, growing, for
7
we as a community are constituting ourselves.1

there is a sense, after all, in which our constitution is sacred and demands our respectful
acknowledgement. If we mistake who we are, our efforts at constitutive action will fail.
So there you have the hedgehog's song: the constitution we have depends upon the
constitution we make and do and are. Except insofar as we do, what we have is powerless
and will soon disappear. Except insofar as, in doing, we respect what we are - both our
actuality and the genuine potential within us - our doing will be a disaster. Neglect any
one of these dimensions, and you will get the idea of our United States Constitution very
wrong.
Id. at 167-69 (emphasis in the original).
11Of course, acts of constituting need not be judicial nor even governmental. Many constitutive
acts - in Pitkin's phrase (supranote 16) acts of "founding, framing, shaping". . . "something lasting,
inclusive, principled and fundamental" - are non-governmental, public, collective and deliberative.
A striking example of such "constituting" is the movement against domestic violence. In West Virginia,
for instance, there is the West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence (WVCADV) composed
of thirteen autonomous local chapters (with very different names, e.g. "HOPE, Inc.", "Family Crisis
Center", "Branches", "YWCA Resolve Family Abuse", "Rape and Domestic Violence Information
Center") twelve of which provide shelters for victims as well as counseling, community education
and social advocacy. Some have programs for the abusers as well. Each local group is funded by a
combination of governmental monies (West Virginia Department of Human Services; Governor's Commission on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections, county commissions; city counsels), collective private
fund raising such as United Way, and individual gifts. WVCADV informition brochure gives a brief
history of this movement:
History of WVCADV
Before 1970, there was virtually no help for battered women and their children in West
Virginia. In the 1970's grassroots, community-based programs began to focus on the need
to respond to domestic violence assault in the communities.
By 1978, several domestic violence programs had developed across the state. The magnitude
and scope of violence in the home heightened the need for those working in shelter programs
to meet. Inspired by shared values and goals, representatives from the shelter program chose
to form a statewide coalition.
Formed in 1979, the West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence is committed to
the elimination of personal and institutional violence against women and their children. Its
aim is to insure and improve provisions of services to survivors of domestic violence through
a forum of support, training and resources. Additionally, WVCADV serves as a vehicle
for promoting change in systems affecting all persons who live in homes where violence
and abuse occur.
WVCADV is an active member of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
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CONSTITUTIONAL KINDNESS

The written Constitution and its interpretation and practice re-

mind us of fundamental values, enshrine them, teach them, and in
particular cases where there has been back sliding, give such vivid
and vital actualization of the value that they become occasions for
celebrations -. for dancing in the streets.18 Each new decision by
anyone purporting to interpret the Constitution is an act by which

we constitute ourselves. 19
But ultimately the Constitution is but an outward sign of the
moral life of the community. It enshrines what is already fundamental. The Court in Gideon v. Wainwright20 said that the right to

counsel means a right to court appointed counsel if the accused
cannot afford to hire his own; all but a few states had done that
for years, presumably because virtually everyone thought funda-

mental fairness required

it.21

NCADV's ultimate goal is the building of a non-violent world.
It is in this way that kindness is "constituted" until another aspect of kindness or manifestation
of the value of social kindness becomes part of our collective "constitution" ultimately to be realized
in the Constitution we "have."
11I was struck some years ago by Professor Harry Kalven's closing out an article celebrating
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with the following footnote:
It is perhaps a fitting postscript to say that I had occasion this summer to discuss the Times
case with Mr. [Alexander] Meiklejohn. Before I had disclosed my own views, I asked him
for his judgment on the Times case. 'It is,' he said, 'an occasion for dancing in the streets.'
As always, I am inclined to think he is right.
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment",
1964 Suip. CT. REv. 191, 221 n.125.
19See Pitkin, supra note 16. The passing of new legislation by a state legislature is a small
constitutive step. The passing of extraordinary legislation - especially that which breaks with tradition
- can be singularly constitutive. For example, West Virginia abolished capital punishment in 1965
(WV.VA. CODE § 61-11-2), and the legislature has since resisted bi-annual efforts to reinstate it. Such
abolition of a fundamental and traditional form of punishment and then persisting in the reform for
some twenty years is constitutive for the West Virginia community and for the larger community of
the nation. When many states do this, then we will be a nation largely without capital punishment,
that is it will be part of what we are and the Supreme Court (even an extremely conservative one)
will declare it so and "no capital punishment" will be part of what we have as a constitution and
the least deserving will have a constitutional right to life.
,a Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21Only Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina did not provide courtappointed counsel in felony cases when Gideon was decided in 1963. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright:
The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. Rv.211, 212.
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We could all recite dozens of cases that articulated, enshrined
and perpetuated the values of freedom - especially political freedom
and equality and fairness. But kindness, what of and equality
kindness as a constitutional value?
KINDNESS AS CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE

To begin with, I must confess that "kindness" as a word for a
constitutional value has no ring to it and is not perfectly suggestive
of the meaning I wish to convey. I wish to convey two distinct
notions: (1) the idea of an enlarged and enlarging community of
moral concern, an expansion of a community's notion of who counts
morally (i.e., of who has moral rights or of who counts in the
utilitarian calculus of pains and pleasures) and (2) the idea of some
minimum due each member of the moral community in terms of
alleviation of suffering, and giving comfort and pleasure. Kindness,
in short, is concern for others, the very heart of morality. By way
of contrast with the other constitutionally enshrined social virtues:
Freedom is concerned with human choosing, striving for happiness
(the pursuit of happiness, say); kindness is concerned with human
comfort (happiness itself). Equality is concerned with parity of striving (as in equality of opportunity) and parity of laws (as in equal
protection of). Kindness is concerned with the worst case, those
unable to strive or who strive ineffectively. In this sense, equal protection cases that require society to pay for an indigent defendant's
transcript on appeal or attorney at trial are instances of kindness,
not equality. 22 Fairnessis concerned with truth (when it is not con-

E.g. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Indeed, a case can be made that the value of social kindness informs at least half of the new
equal protection doctrine. The "modem" doctrine has two tiers (with an ambiguous intermediate
third tier lately developed, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). The upper tier of this new
doctrine which has roots in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and the now infamous Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) has two branches: one rooted in perfecting political
process, the other in concern for pain caused by moral cruelty (See infra note 26). If a classification
disadvantages people based on race or national origin, then it adds to the moral cruelty of societal
prejudice which systematically humiliates and degrades based on an accident of birth, an unchosen
and immutable characteristic. In order to justify such classification, the state must show a very powerful counter-balancing interest, i.e., the classification must be absolutely necessary to a compelling
interest. This is the social kindness branch. Sensitivity to the hurt, the psychic pain, caused by clas-
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cerned with equality, as when people say "unequal treatment" is
"unfair") in meting out life's pains and pleasures, the accurate following of standards for such distribution; kindness is concerned with
the standard of distribution itself and with the feeling of fairness
that comes from the use of some traditional institution of fairness
such as a hearing or legal representation.
Some may suggest that "social justice" is a better word for what
is above described as kindness because "kindness" sounds less like
a right and more like a privilege or grace (a favor rendered by one
without moral obligation to do so or as an unmerited gift from
God). It may be claimed that "kindness" in ordinary usage means
actions over and above the call of moral duty. "Social justice"
sounds the clarion call of natural rights and, after all, the Constitution creates rights for all time, not the sharing of booty of a too
rich elite or a too well rewarded middle class patronizing the poor
and less fortunate. But "social justice" has several flaws as a word
for the constitutional value here described:
(1) It is ambiguous-whose notion of social justice do we adopt,
that of Aristotle, Marx or Posner?
(2) Even if one opts for a particular view of social justice that
is convergent to kindness - e.g., the Fabian Socialism of R. H.
Tawney23 or Critical Legal Studies - such social justice is not descriptive of the social value that is becoming part of our social fab-

sifying according to traits the individual "can't help" and from which quotidian humiliation results

is a mark of growth in constitutional kindness.
The other branch of the new equal protection is concerned with the trustworthiness of the political

process. Ordinarily, the political process can be trusted to make rational classifications and therefore
is owed great deference. But where there is a history of prejudice against a group which otherwise
has little power to protect itself in the political market place, then a court is suspicious of legislative
motive when legislation disadvantages that group. Trust vanishes and with it deference. The court
will "closely scrutinize" such legislation, i.e., it will require the government to prove it has an interest
of overriding importance. Whoever has the burden of proving a legislative fact (bears the de facto
risk of non-persuasion) usually loses (See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. 190).

Indeed, even in cases where the lower tier (rational basis) is used, it is manifest that social
kindness is a value strong enough to overcome majority predilection, fear, and prejudice. Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down the denial by the city of Cleburne,
Texas, of a special permit to operate a group home for the mentally retarded in a residential neighborhood) (See especially Marshall, J., concurring, id. at 455).
See R. TERRIL, R. H. TAwNEY AND HIs Ti~ans, SocuisM As FELaowsnm, (1973).
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ric, of how we are constituted, of our national Constitution. In
short, social justice (in that "radical" sense people would say) is
not what I mean when I am talking about a value that our actual,
real, present Constitution symbolizes.
(3) Kindness includes the amelioration of pain inflicted by society
in the name of retributive justice or corrective (restitutionary) justice
as well as the amelioration of deprivations caused by maldistributions of wealth, while social justice suggests only the latter. Moreover, "social justice" strongly suggests that the market system of
distribution of wealth is fundamentally wrong and at fault for maldistribution. "Kindness" only suggests that deprivations caused by
the inability to create marketable wealth should be alleviated. In
sum "social justice" is a word for a value not yet held, or an "ought"
not an "is." Kindness is a value I claim is presently fundamental
to American political and legal action.
Other alternatives to "kindness" may capture the meaning of
this constituting value more vividly but, I feel, less completely: community, 24 altruism,25 human dignity, decency, compassion, humane-

'4 Community or solidarity is one motive for kindness: the feeling of oneness with others, of
belonging, of a reciprocal protection and stroking that comes from protecting or helping others. But
the word community does not capture an alternative motive for kindness which is better captured by
the word "altruism". Altruistic motives for acts or policies of kindness may be purely egoistic: one
simply feels better for helping others - a feeling which if probed may depend on empathy (I feel
your pain, your joy); indeed, the assumption that empathy precedes sympathy (I feel your pain (empathy) and want to express that fact and help (sympathy)) has caused the former word to replace
the latter in much popular discourse. That altruism may ultimately be (indeed probably is) egoism
does not detract at all from its counting as a moral virtue.
Kind acts, of course, can be motivated by something other than the communitarian or altruistic
impulse. Such acts may flow from individualistic egoism. One may help others not because of some
present feeling of solidarity or empathy but because one will in the long run gain something for
oneself. This is often called enlightened self-interest. Expressions such as "charity is good policy"
suggest such motivation. Charity will redound to our benefit by keeping "the poor" from stealing
from us, disrupting our lives, or engaging in other "anti-social" behavior. "Kind acts," therefore,
may not be "acts of kindness" if only communitarian and altruistic motives are allowed for "true"
kindness.
Moreover, apparent kind acts may be first order egoism and not kind acts at all (let alone, acts
of kindness) where the act of sacrifice or sharing is forced by the beneficiary. If one gives away one's
money at gunpoint, such giving is hardly a kind act. If the rich are forced to give up half their wealth
to the politically powerful poor, that is hardly kindness or a kind act. (The poor recipients would
no doubt call it justice.) But notice that in the case of expropriation of wealth as above described
two acts of first order egoism (acting in one's immediate tangible self-interest) are involved - the
donor avoids immediate pain (or death) - the donee (the one immediately or directly benefited) is
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/8
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ness or humanitarianism and even charity, love, tenderness or mercy.

also the one forcing the transaction. The donor acts to avoid pain to himself - the donee acts to
gain a benefit for himself.
Contrast that with transactions where a third party (say) Robin Hood forces the rich to give to
the poor. Robin Hood's act may indeed be an act of kindness (as in the real Robin Hood myth) or
at least a kind act - Robin may be afraid that if the poor are not fed they may overrun his forest
or become a health hazard to his group. If Robin is a stand-in for the broad middle-class, at least
some of whose support was required for passing a "soak the rich" tax, and some or all of such
necessary support is motivated by a desire to benefit the poor for their own sake (out of sympathy,
solidarity, or humaneness), then the soak-the-rich tax is an act of kindness. (See infra note 25, for
Duncan Kennedy's discussion of involuntary altruism.) Thus, one can see (I hope) that much modem
social welfare legislation can be seen .as acts of kindness. A necessary cause, if not a sufficient cause,
of the legislative act is kindness. Of course, other motivations may also have been necessary to passage:
enlightened self-interest and greed (of the poor or helpless!). Whether one in fact sees welfare legislation as an act of kindness or as a product purely of self-interest (interest group political action
is the assumption of legal positivists of the radical moral relativism variety, morality being pure
personal preference) will be a function of one's meta-political assumptions.
Communitarianism as explained by Professor Mark Tushnet also involves placing society prior
to the individual in a fundamental way:
I argue below, however, that the only coherent basis for the requisite continuities of
history and meaning is found in the communitarian assumptions of conservative social
thought - that, in fact, only these communitarian assumptions can provide the foundations
upon which both interpretivism and neutral principles ultimately depend. Conservative social
thought places society prior to individuals by developing the implications of the idea that
we can understand what we think and do only with reference to the social matrix within
which we find ourselves. If I am correct, the liberal account of the social world is inevitably
incomplete, for it proves unable to provide a constitutional theory of the sort that it demands
without depending on communitarian assumptions that contradict its fundamental individualism.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 785 (1983).
My idea of "social kindness" is perfectly consistent with individualism, albeit not "rugged individualism."
11 In Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAxv. L. REv. 1685 (1976), Duncan
Kennedy defends altruism as a counterethic to individualism:
The rhetoric of individualism so thoroughly dominates legal discourse at present that
it is difficult even to identify a counterethic. Nonetheless, I think there is a coherent, pervasive notion that constantly competes with individualism, and I will call it altruism. The
essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not to indulge a sharp preference for one's
own interest over those of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to
be merciful. It has roots in culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as deep as those
of individualism. (Love thy neighbor as thyself.)
Individualism is to pure egotism as altruism is to total selflessness or saintliness. Thus
the altruist is unwilling to carry his premise of solidarity to the extreme of making everyone
responsible for the welfare of everyone else. The altruist believes in the necessity and desirability of a sphere of autonomy or liberty or freedom or privacy within which one is
free to ignore both the plights of others and the consequences of one's own acts for their
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Without detailing why each word alternative is incomplete or not

welfare.
Private legal justice supposedly consists in the respect for rights, never in the performance of altruistic duty. The state acts through private law only to protect rights, not
to enforce morality.
Nonetheless, it is easy enough to fit fundamental legal institutions into the altruist
mold. The rules against violence,for example, have the effect of changing the balance of
power that would exist in the state of nature into that of civil society. The strong, who
would supposedly dominate everyone if there were no state, are deprived of their advantages
and forced to respect the 'rights' of the weak.
The rules of tort law can likewise be seen as enforcing some degree of altruism. Compensation for injuries means that the interests of the injured party must be taken into account
by the tortfeasor. In deciding what to do, he is no longer free to consult only his own
gains and losses, since these are no longer the only gains and losses for which he is legally
-responsible.
Id. at 1717-19
Then after recounting ways in which altruism is immanent in private law doctrine - indeed in all
legal doctrine - and is often a better explanation for the "court's dilemma" in say a contract ease
"than either class struggle or the needs of a market economy" he concludes with:
Finally, it is a familiar fact that for about a century there has been a movement of
'reform' of private law. It began with the imposition of statutory strict liability on railroads
for damage to cattle and crops, and has persisted through the current redefinition of property
law in the interest of the environment. In the battles and skirmishes of reform, across an
enormous variety of particular issues, it has been common for conservatives to argue that
liberals are consciusly or unconsciously out to destroy the market system. Liberals respond
that the conservative program is a cloak for the interests of big business.
Id. at 1721.
Yet, Kennedy says, neither destroys, or will likely destroy, the other.
If the concepts of individualism and altruism turn out to be useful, it is because they
capture something of this struggle of contradictory utopian visions. It is this dimension that
the ideas of class domination and of social function cannot easily grasp. The approaches
should therefore be complementary rather than conflicting.
Id. at 1722.
Of "forced altruism" he concludes:
The last .objection I will consider is that to characterize fundamental legal institutions
like tort or contract in terms of altruism is wrong because it is nonsense to speak of forcing
someone to behave altruistically. True, the notion requires the experience of solidarity and
the voluntary undertaking of vulnerability in consequence. It therefore implies duties that
transcend those imposed by the legal order. It is precisely the refusal to take all the advantage
to which one is legally, but not morally entitled that is most often offered as an example
of altruism. It follows that when the law 'enforces' such conduct, it can do no more than
make people behave 'as if' they had really experienced altruistic motives. Yet nothing could
be clearer than that, in many circumstances, this is exactly what we want the law to do.
One idea of justice is the organization of society so that the outcomes of interaction are
equivalent to those that would occur if everyone behaved altruistically.
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quite right for this constitutional value I have described as kindness,
let me detail what kindness suggests to me. I have in mind a moral
progression having to do with both pain and pleasure (in the broad-

est sense). The stages of the progress are (1) not inflicting physical
pain on others, physical cruelty being the worst (or at least the most

primitive) unkindness and although kindness is usually thought to
be more than "not unkindness," it nonetheless is the first stage of

a moral actor's rise from cruelty to kindness; 26 (2) the active intervention to prevent others from inflicting physical pain; (3) not in-

flicting psychic pain either by moral cruelty 27 or psychic cruelty28 the reason the cut by Brutus was the "most unkindest cut of all";
(4) preventing others from inflicting psychic pain; (5) providing the
physical necessities of life to those unable (or unwilling, in an age
that prides itself on psychological sophistication the line between
unable and unwilling is quite blurred) to provide them for themselves; (6) seeing that others, as well, so provide; (7) and (8) are
the same as (5) and (6) but for psychic necessities; and (9) and (10)
are the mirror images of (1) and (2) with giving of pleasure substituted for not inflicting pain.
Each stage requires some cost to the agency of kindness. In the
first stage the agent gives up the satisfaction of appeasing rage the enraged twist to the wronging hand, just retaliation for an unjust

6 Professor Judith N. Shklar writes provocatively of cruelty in her recent book J. SmaLAR,
ORDINARY VicEs (1984). In a chapter called fittingly enough, "Putting cruelty first," she defines
cruelty as "the willful inflicting of physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and
fear." Id. at 8.
27 Professor Shklar: "What is moral cruelty? It is not just a matter of hurting someone's
feelings. It is deliberate and persistent humiliation, so that the victim can eventually trust neither
himself nor anyone else." Id. at 37. One can easily see the moral cruelty of slavery, of apartheid,
of antisemitism and of other forms of overt debasement of individuals or groups of people. But what
of the cruelty that often comes from pity ("I don't want your pity" is a persistent cry) and from
the helping hand? The danger of philanthropy is humiliation. Moral cruelty can be a byproduct of
kindness. Moral cruelty is also making someone feel guilty (unjustifiably?) - cruel conscience. But
perhaps cruel conscience is a necessary and relatively benign whip. Tied to the irresolvably (but not
hopelessly) complex ideas of morality, moral cruelty is a most difficult concept.
11 I do not mean to contrast psychic cruelty with moral cruelty. Psychic cruelty is a more general
term and much less problematic. It obviously takes in all moral cruelty however defined. Capital
punishment may or may not be physically cruel or morally cruel, but we can all agree it is psychic
cruelty of the first order.
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act. 29 In the succeeding stages the moral actor gives his present time

and energy and past created wealth to be kind.
Our constitutional history manifests the gradual development of
social kindness as a primary American value. The text speaks emphatically against cruel punishment (or at least no "unusually" cruel
punishment), the most primitive form of kindness. Moreover, the
fifth amendment injunction against compelled incrimination is an
expression of the dignity even of those accused of the worst crimes,
and even they shall not be forced to undergo the psychological cruelty of self-revelation. But proto-kindness, the absence of cruelty,

is only the first step (or two as outlined above) albeit an important
19 Here, we have the notion of the just slap in the face. Again I quote from Professor Shklar:
The unique position of cruelty was indeed fully recognized by Montesquieu's and Locke's
most distinguished heirs. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits,
among other things, the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments.' (citing Granuccl,
Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The OriginalMeeting, 54 CALF. L. REv. 839 (1969)).
Since this amendment has after its long dormancy suddenly come alive, its origins may be
of special relevance. It is not that American governments have become more brutal far
from it but that the experiences of this century have made many of us more aware of the
cruelties that governments generally are capable of. The amendment itself was lifted word
for word from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, but it had altered its meaning over the
years and as it crossed the ocean. Originally it had meant only that no unprecedented,
unlegislated, or disproportionate penalties, especially fines, be imposed. It was perfectly
compatible with drawing and quartering, disemboweling, branding, slitting noses, cutting
off ears, and burning female felons. The last was not abolished until 1790, the others much
later; but Blackstone admitted that 'the humanity of the English nation' no longer authorized
judgments that 'savor of torture or cruelty.' When Patrick Henry and his fellow Virginians
demanded a 'no torture' clause, they had not novel or excessive penalties, but brutality in
mind. To be sure, the phrase was vague, and some gentlemen in the First Congress worried
about too much clemency, arguing that cutting off the ears of offenders might still be
necessary. However, especially in the debates in the States, Beccaria, Montesquieu's humane
disciple, was often invoked by the side that feared cruelty. It was one of the many ways
in which Montesquieu came to join Locke in shaping that generation of Americans. The
liberalism of fear came to be integrated with the liberalism of rights.
J. SinARa, supra note 26 at 238-39.
Notice that the "First Congress worried about too much clemency, arguing that cutting off
the ears of offenders might still be necessary." There are two kinds of justifications for physical
cruelty - just or pious cruelty and instrumental cruelty. In the quoted remark, the First Congress
saw ear lopping as instrumental cruelty; the slap in the face is pious cruelty. That government no
longer justifies any physical punishment is a mark of our progress. Professor Shklar again:
The turn against official cruelty was due to a long but steady moral transformation. I
began this book with 'putting cruelty first' partly because it is such a significant source of
liberalism for many, the most important. But it also marks a great moral turning point.
Its consequences are, moreover, enduring because it remains a fecund source of diversity.
Id. at 239.
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one, of establishing kindness as a constitutional value. Developed

kindness requires a "helping hand," not merely a muted fist, but
no express constitutional language supports the notion of "helping

hand" kindness. Therefore, my claim that developed kindness is a
constitutional value must be predicated on the judicial gloss given

to other constitutional language, or a broadened notion of constitutional value as Hanna Pitkin suggests above, or both.
Our society first extended a "helping hand" by regulating the

vagaries of the private work market - limiting hours of work, keeping children from work, setting minimum wages, and establishing
compensation for work injuries. The Constitution was no help, no

support to that helping hand. Indeed, in a series of well-known
cases, the Constitution slapped the helping hand of growing social
concern.30 It did so in the name of freedom (of the private autonomy

variety) and a vague fear that the helping hand of welfare regulation
would interfere with the just prerogatives of private property. For

thirty years, the Court set the Constitution against social legislation
designed to ameliorate the harsh conditions of the working class.

Finally in the later 1930s, the Court allowed the new legislation not
because kindness was explicitly recognized as a constitutional policy
but because the constitutional freedom that had weighed against this

social concern was recognized as only most tenuously enshrined in
the Constitution (no constitutional language supported the notion
of freedom of contract) and because the social concern manifested
in welfare regulations was at least rational support for constricting
3
contract freedom. '

0 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is, of course, the leading case. Scholars talk of
the Lochner Era or of Lochnering. Lochner involved the limitation by the New York legislature of
bakers to a 60 hour week. It was clearly an attempt to ameliorate the harsh conditions of a particularly
cruel work place in an industry with a politically insignificant number of workers. It would be difficult
to believe the bakers forced such legislation, i.e., that it was interest-group motivated. Rather, their
plight was persuasive to the New York lawmakers. The lawmakers were intervening to protect others
from physical and psychic pain. Their plight was, however, unpersuasive to the constitutional guardians. Only insofar as the bakers' plight might irrvolve actual sickness, could it count at all to countervail
against their right to contract freely to sell their labor.
Viewed starkly as a choice between the values of private autonomy and kindness, Lochner is
instructive. Kindness had not yet arrived as a fundamental value.
1, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), is the breakthrough case. Chief Justice
Hughes' majority opinion in referring to the private autonomy called "freedom of contract":
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So kindness crept into constitutional law as a "rational basis"
for legislative judgments restricting the liberty of private autonomy.

What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks
of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law .... Liberty
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of
the community is due process.
Id. at 391.
He goes on to recognize implicitly that kindness as described above is a valid basis for legislation:
What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and their protection
from unscrupulous and overreaching employers?... The legislature of the State was clearly
entitled to consider. . . [that] women are in the class receiving the least pay, that their
bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who Would
take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The legislature was entitled to adopt
measures to reduce the evils of the 'sweating system', the exploiting of workers at wages
so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very helplessness
the occasion of a most injurious competition. The legislature had the right to consider that
its minimum wage requirements would be an important aid in carrying out its policy of
protection. The adoption of similar requirements by many States evidences a deep-seated
conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as to the means adapted to check it.
Legislative response to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and
that is all we have to decide.
Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
There are two distinct explanations for the demise of substantive due process (also called
economic due process). One focuses on a change in judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court majority,
the other on a change in political values.
The judicial philosbphy adherents point to Holmes' dissent in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74, as
stating the new creed and planting the seed for its ultimate flourishing in the 1930s (United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone is the
seminal formulation). Briefly put the Holmesian philosophy views values as culturally determined and
majoritarian deliberation as the best test for the existence of such values. Therefore, unless the constitutional right asserted against governmental action is an explicitly written proscription, it creates
no right sufficient to overcome the governmental action. This is so because such governmental action
by a political branch is presumed to be majoritarian and that conjuring up constitutional value from
non-explicit language would be "natural law" conjecture or judicial legislation - natural law being
seen as the subjective predilection of judges and judicial legislation as outside the constitutionally
authorized role of judges as well as undemocratic counter-majoritarianism. The political value adherents simply assume that the political values of the Court changed such that a majority of the
Supreme Court came to "believe" or sympathize with the new social welfare legislation. In other
words, the liberal politicians put judges on the Court that shared their political agenda.
The work of the individual judges can be examined and some tentative conclusions reached
as to which of the two proposed causes motivated the individual judge. Holmes, Felix Frankfurter,
and Hugo Black were clearly of the Holmesian democratic positivist judicial philosophy sometimes
called the "damn it let 'em do it" school. Frank Murphy, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall
seem to be motivated by sympathy with the new political values. Some like William 0. Douglas,
Charles Evan Hughes and many others are difficult to assess. They are certainly sympathetic to the
new public ethic, but also talk the majoritarian line. One guesses both motives played and play a
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Congress by the thirties was enacting more affirmative programs of

role in determining the path of the "liberal" judges who have dominated the Court for 50 years.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, is often seen as a revival of substantive due process or "Lochnering". See, e.g., Ely, The Wage of Crying Wolf." A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973). But Wade can be seen as different from judicial intervention in a legislatively resolved conflict
between autonomy and kindness.
For in Wade, what appears as a clash between autonomy and kindness (the legislative resolution
of which is almost always now deferred to) turns out to be in important part, a clash over kinds of
kindness (or, more basically, competing cruelties). A woman's claim to autonomy in choosing whether
to abort is strongly buttressed by the fact that having an infant carries with it some powerful and
longlasting legal and moral obligations which will seem cruel and oppressive if not freely chosen, i.e.,
the obligations will seem a kind of involuntary servitude. Thus, the claim for reproductive autonomy
is cogently involved with avoiding cruelty and not merely a claim of self-fulfillment or self-determination.
The other horn of the dilemma is obviously a kindness value. A human being is killed. He
or she dies a violent death. That is, if a fetus is a human being! This is, of course, a moral question
and not a factual question (of biological science) as Justice Blackmun's opinion in Wade would have
it. The moral question is "who counts as part of the community of moral concern?" Who (what
people or animals - see P. SINGER, Animal Liberation (1975)) has moral rights? Without moral rights
one is treated as a thing, a mere instrument to the service of those having moral rights.
Historically, world-wide, communities have made race, nationality, language, sex and other
fortuities of birth the basis of moral standing in the community. Moral progress is generally seen as
the expansion of such standing both as to movement toward fuller standing of those denied full
standing and an enlargement of the identity of those having some, at least minimal, standing or, as
it is often called, moral "worth." From immediate family to tribe to nation, the moral community
has grown, and is growing. "Differences" are at first tolerated, then fully accepted.
However, there has always been an alternative way of defining moral worth. Based on an
intuitively appealing notion of reciprocity, one's moral worth is often seen as proportionate to one's
moral goodness. One's moral rights are tied to one's faithfulness to moral duty. The more innocent
one is the more one deserves moral concern. The good are in God's grace and will have eternal peace.
The bad are damned forever. Thus songwriter Billy Joel laments the seeming irony "that only the
good die young" and a minister writes a book entitled "When Bad Things Happen to Good People."
This notion of tying moral worth to moral virtue is often seen as religiosity. And religions do promote
this idea; indeed it is central to much conservative religious practice. But, I believe, the notion of a
rough reciprocal bond between moral rights and duties is powerfully intuitive and each of us makes
decisions based on it.
The anti-abortionists' definition of person, i.e., of who has moral worth, is tied very closely
to goodness. The fetus is entirely innocent and thus deserves more concern even than the mother.
Relative innocence as the basis of moral worth explains the apparent paradox that anti-abortionists
are often comfortable with capital punishment. It is imposed on those so bad that they have lost all
moral worth. To those who so believe, arguments about deterrence (or the lack thereof) fall on deaf
ears. To them death is the "just desserts" of a murderer. Assuredly some who favor capital punishment
also mix in an instrumentalist's rationale: we must sacrifice the murderer to deter others and the
sacrifice is tolerable because of the low moral worth of the culprit. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
A saRicAN LAW (1973), especially Part III, Ch. VIII, "The Underdogs: 1847-1900", where he writes
of the different treatment of the "worthy" and "unworthy poor." "Worthy meant, in essence, guiltless." Id. at 431-32.
On the other hand, liberals count it a mark of progress that moral worth not be tied (at least
importantly) to goodness. According to this view, bad environments create bad people (or a com-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

social welfare. The helping hand did more than merely prevent private harm, it now provided positive relief -

old age benefits and

unemployment compensation. These too leapt the constitutional hurdles. Still, this provided only passive recognition of social kindness
as a constitutional value. Finally, in the late sixties, the Supreme

Court gave affirmative recognition to governmental largess for the
needy. In Shapiro v. Thomson,3 2 Goldberg v. Kelly33 and Sniadach

v. Family Corp.3 4, the Court disallowed unfair interference with receipt of one's welfare due. The Court stopped well short of stating
that one had a constitutional right to welfare, but, nonetheless, gave

strong constitutional recognition to the priorities of social kindness
-

35
enshrined welfare kindness in the constitutional pantheon.
But what of capital punishment? Surely the failure to strike down

this cruelest of punishments militates against the notion that kindbination of inherited genes and inherent circumstance create bad people). Therefore, one ought not
be "blamed" for being bad. People do not "deserve" to be punished. Criminal punishment is justified
only as deterrent (by setting an example and banishing those with a demonstrated propensity to crime)
and as opportunity to intervene in lives and "correct" the harm-causing propensities. The fundamentalists sneer at this view as "secular humanism." Liberals assume the fundamentalists to be ignorant, unthinking and primitive.
What liberals do count as giving moral worth is consciousness of pain and pleasure or of selfconsciousness (consciousness of consciousness). It is assumed that a fetus at an early state has neither.
(A two or three year old child does not have the latter - which, of course, raises some difficulties
for this view). For an excellent brief discussion of most of the arguments other than the differencesin-moral-worth conflict above outlined see Glover, Matters of Life and Death, XXXI N.Y. Rev. of
Books, May 30, 1985, at 19.
Thus the abortion controversy is over two views of cruelty based on conflicting assumptions
about the basis of moral worth. It was not a choice of autonomy over kindness in derogation of the
opposite legislative choice. It was judicial substitution of its version of the weightier cruelty. Whether
such a substitution is consistent with a proper role for judicial review in a democracy is another
question. In any event, it was not a victory for autonomy over kindness (the old substantive due
process) but an effort, however clumsy and imperfect, to harmonize two visions of human kindness.
32 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
For commentary See Rosenheim, Shapiro v.
Thompson: The BeggarsAre Coming to Town, 1969 Sup. Cr. Rav. 303. Although a lawyer, Professor
Margaret X. Rosenheim taught in the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago,
and wrote from a social welfare perspective.
33Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See especially page 262 n.8 ("It may be more realistic
today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity."') (also citing Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964) and Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Social Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1245 (1965)).
3" Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). (Here not welfare largess from the
state but private subsistance income was at stake).
31 "Meanwhile, Shapiro stands as a high water mark of judicial indignation over a discrimination
which betrays the meanness and inhumanity of public assistance." Rosenheim, supra note 32, at 34546.
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ness is a constitutional value. But the enshrined value need not be
full realization of value. The Court has modified the use of capital
punishment. The Court has made halting steps to make fairer its
imposition.3 6 We are not yet ready as a polity to constitute ourselves
as a society recognizing the basic human dignity of the least deserving, the most hateful, harmful, unkindly and useless among us.
It's a tall order. Constitutional kindness, equality, and fairness tug
in that direction. Eventually, we will build new prisons and treat
kindly those who do not "deserve it" but do - just because they
37
are human beings.

VIRTUE OF ENSHRINING VALUES

Even if our Constitution does broadly stand for an enlarged concern for an expanded human family, does that fact push us anywhere
or does it merely stand as an empirical observation, an historical
updating of our status as a civilization? Like the other constitutional
values, enshrinement matters - it teaches, it reinforces, it entrenches
those values against slippage in hard times, and encourages expansion in good times. Ah, yes, Professor Bickel, it encourages progress .38 As Mr. Justice Brennan stated recently:3 9
26

Furnam v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) & see Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and

the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 Hav. L. Rev. 313 (1986); Sumner v. Shuman, 107

S.Ct. 2716 (1987).
17 In the end one must remain skeptical as to the power of evidence to change ancient
beliefs and sentiments. The greater hope lies in the expectation that with better times our
sentiments will reach the 'standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'
[Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)]
Justices Brennan and Marshall thought - wrongly it appears - that we had already sufficiently matured.
The conclusion that the personal sentiments of the judges play a decisive role is strengthened by reading the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth
v. O'Neal, [367 Mass. 440, 339 N.E.2d 676 (1975)] which held a mandatory death sentence
upon a conviction for rape-murder to be unconstitutional. That court had before it on the
deterrence issue the very same evidence that was before the United States Supreme Court
in Gregg. Yet the majority of the Massachusetts court accepted the evidence as proof of
the inability of the death sentence to deter. The lack of proof of deterrent effect deprived
the government 'compelling state interest' to justify the death penalty.
Why did the Supreme Court and the Massachusetts court arrive at a different decision?
The decisive factor was the simple fact that in the United States Supreme Court only two
of the nine Justices felt that 'the standard of decency' required abolition while the Massachusetts court five out of seven felt that way.
Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 317, 343.
's A. BICKEL, THE SutPREm COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
3 Brennan, supra note 36, at 331.
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I am convinced that law can be a vital engine not merely of change but of other
civilizing change. That is because law, when it merits the synonym justice, is
based on reason and insight. . . . On occasion, these insights are momentous,
such as when we finally understand that separate can never be equal. I believe
that these steps, which are the building blocks of progress, are fashioned from

a great deal more than the changing views of judges over time. I believe that
problems are susceptible to rational solution as we work hard at making and
understanding arguments that are based on reason and experience. With respect
to the death penalty, I believe that a majority of the Supreme Court will one
day accept that when the state punishes with death, it denies the humanity and
dignity of the victim and transgresses the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.

Let me add tendentiously, that the denial of the "humanity and
dignity of the victim" (i.e., victim of the state's cruelty through
capital punishment) to that extent denies the humanity and dignity
of all of us of We the People. It is the most unkindest cut of all.
And finally because our hard law and soft law Constitution is
law, the Constitution as law is itself a symbol of the ideal of permanent values, of unshakable commitment. Such an idea of inalienable rights - an idea- shared by most - protects each of us as
individuals from the rest of us as a collective, and at the same time,
the shared idea of shared ideals brings us together as a community.
And that is worth celebrating.

POSTSCRIPT: BORK AND THE KINDNESS VALUE
The recent defeat of the nomination of Robert Bork to sit on
the Supreme Court is suggestive to me of the force of public kindness
as a fundamental value. His defeat I believe was due to his being
perceived as lacking commitment to the value of public kindness.
The milk of personal kindness may have poured from Bork's every
private action. No matter. It is my sense that original intent and
majority rule, the cornerstones of his judicial philosophy, were perceived by members of the Judiciary Committee, the Senate, and the
public generally as a mask for not deeply caring for other people
(people outside one's circle of family, friends and acquaintances);
the folks we don't know, and seldom see, those people - the very
young and the very old, the physically and mentally handicapped
and disabled, the sick and dying, the criminally accused and convicted, the victims of physical and moral cruelty, of racist .and sexist 22
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practice, the victims of crime and domestic abuse, the victims of
unsafe and unhealthy work conditions, the victims of catastrophic
loss and economic displacement and hard times - whom public
institutions have increasingly protected since early in this century.
How could original intent and majority rule be seen to mask
public mean-spiritedness? Because temporary majorities can rule
against the measures of the humane society on the basis of panic,
fear, loss of economic confidence, ignorance and prejudice. It is not
that the public wants the courts to impose such measures wholesale;
rather, the public wants courts to be friendly to them, to be solicitious of the people protected by them, to require a "sober second
look" (in Alexander Bickle's phrase) before such measures are withdrawn or diminished, and to require the majority to rethink its public measures (as with Furman v. Georgia) of both calculated and
unconscious cruelty.
And Bork's notion of originalintent would simply not recognize
the constitutional value of public kindness except in a most incipient
and stunted form (i.e., a narrow, "as originally conceived" cruel
and unusual punishment clause and that alone), and not help it
grow. The humane society has roots in the nineteenth century, but
has come to flower only recently and still has far to go. When we
really take a careful look, we want our judges to be sympathetic to
this progress. Bork, whether rightly or wrongly, was felt to be cool
to human kindness and cold to humane progress.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 8

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/8

24

